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Appeal No.
13858

Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant
RESPONDENT DOES NOT SHOW ERROR
IN APPELLANT'S POSITION
In our brief we pointed to the evidence which shows
a duty or obligation on McKee's part relative to the
Houben bond, a breach of that duty by McKee, and that
GSL sustained damage as a proximate result of that
breach. "We also showed that the trial court's findings
of fact to the contrary are not supported by the evidence1 and that the court erred in its conclusions of law.
For clarity, we will examine respondent's response
under the headings of our opening brief.
1
The substantial evidence required to support findings of fact is "more
than a mere scintilla of evidence." Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Ut. 61,
239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951).

1
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I
McKEE IS LIABLE TO GSL IN THE
AMOUNT OF THE PERFORMANCE BOND
WHICH WAS REQUIRED OF HOUBEN.
A. McKee's duties as GSL's procurement agent
included the duty to see that Houben was bonded: —
We pointed out in our opening brief that it was McKee's
duty to see that Houben obtained the performance bond
required by the purchase order McKee issued to Houben
(pp. 16-19) and that GSL did not assume that duty
(pp. 37-39).2 McKee has cited two exhibits and the
testimony of three witnesses to sustain its assertion
that there was substantial evidence to support Finding
of Fact No. 6 (Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-13). An examination of each of these items of evidence discloses
that they sustain GSL's position and do not support
the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
on this issue.
1. The minutes of the meeting held on August
20, 1969? It will be recalled that McKee had overall
project design responsibility for GSL's process plants
and purchased many items including the conveyor sys2
The trial court's memorandum decision did not question McKee's duty.
(R. 86.) The findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by counsel
for McKee are inconsistent. They do not disclose the "discerning line for
decision," United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 376 U.S. 651,
656-657 (1964), but range all the way from a theory of non-duty and nonfault on McKee's part to the conflicting theories of waiver, contributory negligence and estoppel on GSL's part.

See the following additional comments with respect to the importance of
the preparation of findings of fact in cases tried to the court: Kelson v. United
States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1294-1295 (CA. 10, 1974); and particularly United
States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942-943 (CA. 2, 1942).
3

Exhibits 23-D and 27-P are copies of the same minutes.

s
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tern as "contract packages'' from "outside vendors."
(Opening brief, p. 5.) The flow of certified drawings
and other engineering information between McKee's
engineers and its vendors was critical to the project
time schedule. Hence GSL's offer and McKee's acceptance of Mr. Derricott's services to expedite the flow
of engineering information. (Andrews, Tr. 42; Brinkmann, Tr. 54.) The minutes of the August 20 meeting
are directly to the point of Mr. Derricott's duties.
The opening paragraph, not mentioned in McKee's
brief (p. 11), says that on August 20, 1969, representatives of GSL and McKee sat down
"to confirm the expediting procedure to secure
outstanding engineering information that is critical to the project schedule." (Emphasis supplied.)
The third paragraph says that Mr. Derricott was
to perform the expediting,
"which is indicated in the minutes of weekly
meetings and as supplemented by other communications from McKee Engineering. * * *"
The fourth paragraph refers to Material Control
documents and to Purchase Order supplements as additional sources of the engineering information required.
The last paragraph, not mentioned by McKee, concludes with a further reference to the subject of Mr.
Derricott's duties:
"Engineering information should be transmitted
according to the purchase order instruction."

3
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The memorandum does not say that Mr. Derricott
was to follow up on non-engineering matters such as
bonds. The memorandum is silent on such matters. As
the memorandum shows, Mr. Ferguson, McKee's purchasing agent for the project, was present at the meeting, but when he testified he did not contradict the memorandum (Tr. 175-176) :
Q. (ME. BAKER) Can you tell me what the
actual practice was relative to the expediting that
Mr. Derricott did?
A. (ME. FEEGUSON) He had access to the
documents pertaining to the Purchase Order, and
he could expedite, from his position, drawings
and such without contacting me. However, the
way it worked in practice, as I recall, is that
we would be — we would have conversations
with each other frequently and if drawings were
missing on a particular order he would say,
"Have you heard anything from such and such
a vendor?" And I might say, "No, I haven't,
but I am going to be calling them later today.
I will ask them." Or I might say, " I will call
them." We had this sort of interchange where
we worked presently with each other.
No witness said that Mr. Derricott ?s duties were other
than as stated in the memorandum.
Four weeks after the meeting on engineering matters, on September 18, 1969, McKee issued its purchase
order for the conveyor system requiring that Houben
be bonded. (Ex. 11-P.) There is no evidence that McKee
ever asked Mr. Derricott to follow up on the bond.

4
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2. Mr. Bririkmann's engineering report of October 6,1969* It is clear from a reading of the document
and from Mr. Brinkmann's testimony (Tr. 44-55), not
mentioned in McKee's brief (p. 11), that his report was
talking about the same subject as the minutes of the
August 20 meeting, namely GrSL's participation in the
expediting of engineering information. The very portion of the report quoted by McKee (p. 11) is in accord
with the minutes of the August 20 meeting and with
Mr. Ferguson's testimony regarding Mr. Derricott's
duty to expedite vendor drawings.
3. Testimony of Mr. Andrews. Nothing was
said by Mr. Andrews, in the testimony cited by McKee
(p. 12) with respect to following up on non-engineering matters. Mr. Andrew's testimony on the subject
of Mr. Derricott's duties (Tr. 41-42) and the testimony
of Mr. Brinkmann on that subject (Tr. 54-58) was not
mentioned in McKee's brief.
4. Testimony of Mr. Derrieott. There is no
statement in the portion of Mr. Derricott's deposition,
which was read at the trial and cited in McKee's brief
(p. 12), that his assistance to McKee included the follow up on non-engineering information such as bonds.
Mr. Derrieott acknowledged the obvious, that McKee's
purchase order called for a bond, but neither he nor
anyone else said that his duties included non-engineering matters such as bonds. It is significant, we believe,
that counsel never asked Mr. Derrieott or anyone else
^Exhibit 19-D.

•.,..;,
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if Mr. Derricott's duties included assistance to McKee
in following up on non-engineering matters such as bonds.
5. Testimony of Mr, Ferguson. The testimony
cited in McKee's brief (p. 12) goes to the general duties
of an expediter, many of which Mr. Ferguson performed
on this project. (Tr. 180-185.) The testimony immediately following the cited portion, going to Mr. Derricott's duties assigned in the August 20 meeting (Ex.
27-P), confirms that those duties involved engineering
information (Tr. 175-176). Mr. Ferguson never said
that Mr. Derricott's duties included following up on
bonds.
No mention is made in McKee's brief of Mr. Ferguson's testimony that it was he who had responsibility
for the administration of the purchase orders issued by
McKee on GSL's project and that he followed up on
other non-engineering matters (Exs. 53-P, 54-P, 55-P,
56-P) as he did with respect to Houben's bond (Tr. 175,
177,180-185).
No evidence is cited by McKee to show that at any
time McKee turned over to GSL the responsibility for
the bond called for in McKee's purchase order. We have
set forth in our opening brief (pp. 6-10, 37-39) the evidence on the subject of responsibility for the bond.
B. McKee's duties as GSL's procurement agent
included the duty of prompt action including notice with
respect to the performance bond required of Houben: —
McKee does not challenge the point that an agent is
6
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bound to act promptly and with diligence while on his
principal's business and to give timely notice if he finds
himself unable or unwilling to carry out his undertaking. There is no evidence that McKee ever asked to
be relieved of its responsibility with respect to the bonding of Houben or that before November 6 or 20, 1969,
it called to GiSL's attention Houben's failure to obtain
the bond. Mr. Ferguson's testimony that after November 6 or 20 he probably or possibly told someone at
GSL of his telephone call to Houben (Tr. 178, 184-185)
is refuted by the sworn answers to interrogatories, 5
which he helped prepare (Tr. 195-196), that McKee did
not tell GSL that a bond had not been obtained.

•C. GSL ivas damaged by McKee's failure to act
promptly and is entitled to recover from McKee the
amount of the bond: — McKee does not challenge GSL's
point that had the bond been obtained without delay it
would have been available to GSL when Houben left
the job as Mr. McNeil and Mr. Ferguson testified. (Tr.
183, 275). Nor does McKee challenge the point that the
amount of the bond is the measure of GSL's damage.
Instead McKee argues in its brief (p. 27) that
Houben could have been terminated and all amounts
due Houben could have been retained by GSL as stated
in Finding of Fact No. 7 (R. 89). This argument and
the finding ignore the provisions of the bond. (Ex. 16-P.)
The surety would have been liable either (1) to com5
Question No. 9 (R. 12) and the answer (R. 21). See footnote 6 at
page 7 of our opening brief.
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plete the contract or (2) to obtain a contractor and to
advance funds sufficient to pay the cost of completion.
Assuming the surety company would have elected the
second alternative, it would have had to advance the
sum of $300,000. For example:
$1,080,2596

Cost of completion
Less balance of contract price:
Amount payable to
contractor
$739,344
Less amount properly
paid to contractor
57,7347

681,610
$ 398,649

Surety would advance (not
to exceed amount of bond)

$ 300,000

McKee points to no testimony that GSL would
have derived any benefit from the termination of Houben
in November or later. McKee's officers on the project
clearly believed that termination would not have been
appropriate. Mr. McNeil who was in charge and knew
Houben was not bonded took no action to terminate
Houben and did not suggest that GSL do so. He approved payment to Houben. (Tr. 275-276.) Mr. McNeil's
suggestion that other engineering companies could have
completed the conveyor system was given without having raised the question with those companies. He did
not consider (1) the cost of delay in replacing Houben,
(2) whether other companies would have done the work
6
Ex. 15~P, less April 1970 payment to Houben of $105,565 which was
paid after GSL had learned there was no bond. Mr. Brinkmann testified that
the payment was made by his mistake, and contrary to Mr. Andrews' instructions. (Tr. 229-230.)
7
Ex. 15-P, page 2, line 3.

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at their earlier bid prices after learning the first contractor would be replaced, (3) whether Houben would
have consented to its replacement, and (4) whether
Coastal Plains, one of the original bidders, would have
given the guarantee which earlier it had refused to
give, (See the evidence reviewed in our opening brief
at pp. 14-15,42.)
The proposition is advanced in McKee's brief that
Houben could not have obtained a bond in September
or October 1969 (pp. 25-26). No evidence has been cited
in its support. Mr. Parker, who was called by McKee
and was specifically asked by the trial court at what
point Houben could not have obtained a bond, said
"after October of 1969 I don't think they could have."
(Tr. 172-173.) The Finding of Fact No. 9, which was
proposed by McKee and which McKee now appears to
challenge, did not say that Houben could not have obtained a bond in September or October. The finding
says probably Houben would not have been able to obtain a bond on November 14, 1969. (R. 90) McKee's
people, who had investigated Houben, including its financial situation (Tr. 275), after representing to GSL
that McKee's vendors came from a list of " qualified
and acceptable bidders" (Ex. 24-P, part P-3, at p. 3)
and who knew a bond was required,8 believed that
McKee could be bonded on August 21 (Ex. 9-P) and
September 18 (Ex. 11-P). If not, an admission has been
made that McKee breached its duty of care for GSL's
8

McKee acknowledged in paragraph 5 of its answer to the complaint
(R. 6, par. 5) and in its answers to interrogatories that a bond was required
of Houben (Answer to questions 20 and 22 in GSL's first set of interrogatories
(R. 13-14,23)).
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interests when it contracted with Houben for the conveyor system.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT GSL IS BARRED BY WAIVER
OR CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OR IS
ESTOPPED FROM RECOVERING FROM
McKEE.
A. GSL did not ivaive its rights as against McKee
with respect to the bond: — McKee's brief does not
point to any evidence of these essential elements of
waiver:°
(a) that GSL intended to relinquish its rights
with respect to the bonding of Houben,
(b) that GSL expressed such an intention distinctly,
(c) that McKee gave any consideration to be
released from its duties to GSL,
(d) that McKee understood and accepted the
asserted waiver, and
(e) that the asserted waiver was timely.
"Without evidence of the elements of waiver, the trial
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect to waiver are unsupported. (See our discussion
of these elements in the light of evidence at pp. 29-31
of our opening brief.)
9

Opening brief, pp. 26-29.
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The cases cited by McKee (pp. 37-41) are not to
the point. In the only cases involving bonds, Lesser v.
William Holiday Cord Associates, Inc., 349 F.2d 490
(C.A. 8, 1965), and Hevenor v. Union Railroad Co. of
New York City, 198 N.Y.S. 409 (1923), the bonds
were required as conditions precedent to the commencement of the work but the contractor, with owner's knowledge, commenced work without the bond. Not so in this
case. Here McKee authorized Houben to commence work
some four weeks before it got around to stating the requirement for a bond. The requirement in this case was
that a bond be obtained and copies be delivered to McKee
"without delay." No waiver was found in Phoenix
Insurance Company v. Heath, 90 Ut. 187, 61 P.2d 308
(1936), or in American Savings and Loan Association v.
Blomquist, 21 TL2d 289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968). In Ahrendt
v. Bobbitt, 119 Ut. 465, 229 P.2d 296 (1951), the question, as this court stated, was "whether this condition
precedent could be waived" (229 P.2d at 297). The
question was not, as it is here, whether the evidence
supported a finding of waiver. In Ahrendt there was
no transcript of the evidence and under those circumstances this court had to assume that the evidence sustained the finding. The cases cited by McKee, therefore, do not contradict the law as set forth at pp. 26-31
of our opening brief.
B. The defense of contributory negligence is not
available to McKee in this case: — The authorities cited
by McKee (pp. 34-35) do not contradict the rule that
a principal's negligence will not relieve an agent of

11
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liability based in contract as opposed to tort. But even
if the law were otherwise or if GrSL were asserting
liability based only in tort, McKee has failed to show
any causal connection between the events which occurred
in November 1969 (referred to at pp. 14-15 of its brief)
and the injury GSL sustained by reason of McKee's
failure to see that the bond was obtained without delay.
All of the events referred to by McKee occurred after
the opportunity for bonding Houben had passed, as the
following chronology of events shows:

12
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AUGUST

1

21
<

SEPTEMBER

4 weeks

OCTOBER

1

I

18
X

6

|

7 weeks

NOVEMBER
I I I
14 18 20

DECEMBER
1

>

August 21 — McKee letter of itent to Houben.10
September 18 — McKee purchase order to Houben calling for bond "without delay."11

":

October
November
Houben unable to obtain a bond after October.12
6 — McKee called Houben first time for bond.13
14

.
15

14 — Parker called GSL re assignment.

Houben's first billing to GSL approved by McKee.
16

18 — GSL memos re bond sent to McKee.

20 — McKee called Houben second time for bond.17 Houben request for disbursement in care of law fkm.18
December 1 — GSL disbursement to Houben.19
IOEX. 9-P

18

16

"Ex. 11-P
"Tr. 168, 172-173

14

17

Tr. 177

Tr. 162-163
15
Exs. 41-D, 42-D; Tr. 275-276

Ex. 22-D; Tr. 120,227

Tr. 175, 177,184-185
18
Ex. 29-D
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19

Ex. 36-D

McKee has not contradicted the rule that if the
parties had learned of Houben's circumstances in November, 1969, when the time for obtaining the bond had
passed, GSL could not have been required to do more
than to act reasonably under the circumstances. (Opening
brief, pp. 34-35.) No one testified that the termination of
Houben at that point or later would have been to GSL's
benefit. The only testimony as to the reasonableness
of GSL's conduct and the practical necessity of continuing with the original contractor is referred to at
pp. 15, 42 of our opening brief.
McKee has pointed to no evidence of knowledge
on the part of GSL of the bond's absence in September
or October to support Finding of Fact No. 8. See our
opening brief at p. 9 with respect to evidence as to November 18, which date was the subject of Mr. Derricott's
deposition.
C. This is not a case for the application of the doctrine of estoppel: — McKee has not called attention in
its brief (pp. 41-42) to any material fact which it claims
GSL induced McKee to believe and which GSL should
now be precluded from denying. Nor has McKee pointed
to any change of position on McKee's part by reason
of an alleged inducement. The record is silent with respect to any showing of a wrongful intent or culpability on the part of GSL or that McKee was excusably ignorant of the true facts. Therefore, the doctrine
of estoppel is not available to McKee. Migliaccio v.
Dcwis, 120 Ut. 1, 232 P.2d 195, 198 (1951).
14
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The suggestion that McKee has suffered pecuniary
loss by reason of any breach of duty owed to it by GSL
(pp. 42-43) seems to us to distort things terribly. McKee
has never claimed any loss by reason of its employment
as GSL's agent and no authority is cited for the proposition that a principal is bound to protect his agent
from liability for a breach of the agent's duty to his
principal. If the evidence makes a case for estoppel by
silence, the party to be stopped is the agent who led
its principal in harm's way by failing to see that the
bond was obtained without delay and gave no warning.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the trial court on plainitff's complaint should be reversed with directions that judgment be entered for the
plaintiff.
Eespectfully,
SENIOR & SENIOR
Claron C. Spencer

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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